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Sullivan et al.: California Law Survey

SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW
This survey of California law, a regular feature of
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent
California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal
decisions of special importance to women.
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1. In an action for spousal support, a trial court
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CRIMINAL LAW

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1990).
A photo of a minor need not be obscene to satisfy the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" requirement of the
Federal Statute regulating child pornography.

In Arvin, the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and
sentence of appellant, Michael Arvin, under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)1
for mailing three photographs of minor females engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 2 The court held that the district court did
not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment and in excluding
expert testimony.3 The court also found the jury instructions,
read as a whole, properly informed the jury as to the meaning of
"lascivious. "4
Arvin stipulated at trial that he knowingly mailed three
photocopied photographs of nude female children to undercover
officer Jeffrey Miller. Arvin mailed the photocopies in response
to an advertisement placed by Miller in Swinger's Digest seeking a pedophile correspondent. The photocopies were of pictures
he had purchased several years earlier. Arvin was not the photographer, nor did he seek financial compensation from Miller.
All three pictures show apparently prepubescent girls completely nude, facing the camera with their legs apart so as to
expose their genitals. The pictures were captioned "Lolita-Sex,"
"Skoleborn-School Children," and "Little Girls F_k too."
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) punishes:
Any person who. . . knowingly. . . mails any visual depiction, if(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct...
18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) defines a "minor" as "any person under the age of eighteen years." §
2256(2) defines "sexually explicit conduct" to include various specific sexual acts, as well
as the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person." "Lascivious" is
not defined.
2. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1386-87.
3. Id. at 1390.
4. Id. at 1392.
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Arvin's motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. The government's motion in limine to exclude expert witnesses on the
question of whether the pictures were "lascivious" was granted:!
The court in beginning its analysis first focused on the difference between obscenity laws and child pornography laws .. Citing New York u. Ferber,6 the court stated that pornographic de. pictions of children do not receive First Amendment protection
even if they are not "obscene."7 While obscenity laws aim to
protect "the sensibilities of unwilling recipients,"S child pornography laws aim to protect the children themselves from sexual
exploitation and abuse. s The issue is whether the child has been
physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the
work. A sexually explicit depiction need not be offensive in order
to have required the sexual exploitation of a child for its production. lo Therefore, the obscenity tests regarding "community
standards," "redeeming value," and "prurient interest" are not
relevant in determining what constitutes child pornography.ll
I

The appellant first argued to dismiss the indictment based
on the district court's interpretation of section 2252(a)!2 Appellant claimed that since he had no commercial motivation, the
statute could not constitutionally or by its terms apply to him. IS
However, the statute had been amended so that the mailing no
longer need be for commercial purposes. 14 Appellant's second argument for dismissal was that the photos were not "lascivious"
as a matter of law!!! The court rejected this argument, conceding
that while it was arguable that the pictures are not lascivious,
the issue of lasciviousness was properly allowed to go to the
jury!6
5. [d. at 1387.
6. 485 U.S. 747 (1982).
7. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1387.
8. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973).
9. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
10. [d. at 761 & n.12.
11. [d.
12. See note 1, supra.

13. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1388.
14. (As originally enacted the statute required that the mailing be "for the purpose
of sale or distribution for sale". Following the decision in Ferber, Congress amended the
statute and deleted this clause.) [d.
15. [d.
16. [d.
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Appellant further argued that he was deprived of a fair trial
by not being allowed to present expert testimony on the issue of
whether the pictures were lascivious. 17 Arvin made two arguments regarding the admission of expert testimony: 1) that the
evidence should have been admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 702,18
and 2) that the evidence should have been admitted to avoid a
violation of the First Amendment. 19 The court found that the
admissibility or exclusion of expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial court and that the benchmark for exclusion is
whether the proffered testimony would usurp the function of the
jury.20 Whether a particular situation calls for the use of expert
testimony is to be determined on the basis of "assisting the
trier."21 The court held that according to Arvin's offer of proof,
the expert's testimony would not have been directed at any legally relevant factors or would have impinged on the jury's
function. 22
Appellant argued that the experts would have testified that
similar photos are used for educational purposes. However, the
court found that community tolerance for equivalent material is
irrelevant. 23 Scientific or other value will not necessarily save a
photo from legitimate prohibition. 24 According to appellant, experts also would have testified that the fact that someone may
be sexually aroused by the photos does not necessarily make
them lascivious. The court agreed but found that the fact that
the photos have that effect may nonetheless be relevant. 25 The
statute reflects a legislative determination that it is a form of
child abuse for a photographer to pose a child sexually for purposes of the photographer's or another's sexual gratification. 26
Thus, the court found that the apparent motive of the photogra17. [d.
18. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as 'an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." (emphasis added)
19. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1389.
20. [d. (citing United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d. 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1986)).
21. Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1389 (citing Advisory Committee Note to Rule 702).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

[d.
[d. at 1390.
[d. at 1389 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 & n.12).
[d. at 1389.
[d.
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pher and intended response of the viewer are relevant. 27
Arvin's third argument was that the trial court wrongly instructed the jury on the legal definition of "lascivious." The
judge gave a list of eight specific factors that the jury could consider.28 The judge guarded against the jury attaching undue significance to any particular factor by cautioning them that the
27.Id.
28. Id. at 1390-91 n.4. "[T)he elements of the offense break down into the following:

Number one is a knowing mailing. Now, in this case that's admitted, so there's ... no
necessity for you making a decision on that.
Second, a visual depiction. [T)he pictures in this case are obviously visual
depictions.
Third, the use of a minor. You will have to decide that issue based upon your observation of the pictures themselves.
And finally, fourth element-and the one I think that you're going to have to wrestle
with in making your decision, because I think it's the key to this case-is the lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic areas.
[W)hen you see the photographs, it is obvious that they do involve the genitals and
pubic area. So your decision-you must decide whether the exhibitions are lascivious.
[T)he statute does not define... what the word "lascivious" means. But some courts
have considered the subject of what lascivious means. Even those courts have not given
to us a precise definition of what that word means. They have generally held that the
word lascivious is virtually interchangeable with the word "lewd."
And the courts have also given us a listing of factors which you, as the decision
makers, can consider in deciding whether the pictures are lascivious.
. . .I'm going to list for you eight factors which the courts have said that you would
have to decide whether these photographs were lascivious-can consider in making that
decision .
. . .[T)hese are the factors that you can consider in deciding whether the pictures
involve the lascivious exhibition of the genitals or the pubic area:
Number one: whether the focal point of the pictures is on the child's genitals or
pubic area.
Number two: whether the setting is sexually suggestive. For example, in a place or
pose generally associated with a sexual activity.
Number three: whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, considering the
age of the child.
Number four: whether the child was clothed or nude.
Number five: whether the pictures suggest sexual coyness or willingness to engage in
sexual activity.
Number six: whether the pictures are intended or designed to elicit sexual response
from the viewer.
Number seven: whether the picture portrays the child as a sexual object.
And number eight: [the) captions on the pictures.
[A) visual depiction need not involve all of those factors in order to be a lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, but those are the factors which you can consider.
And the weight or lack of weight which you give to anyone of those factors is for you to
decide.
[T)hose pictures may not be found to be lascivious merely because you may not like
them or because you may find them to be in bad taste."
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weight given to anyone factor was for them to decide. 29 Arvin's
argument was that this instruction allowed the jury to find "lasciviousness" from the mere presence of one factor-for example
nudity or suggestive captions. The court disagreed with this argument and stated that viewing the instructions as a whole, no
reasonable' juror would interpret them to allow a guilty verdict
from the factor of nudity alone. 30 The court concluded that the
jury was properly instructed. In fact, the court stated that "the
jurors were told about as well as any jurors could be what they
should consider in making a determination as to whether the
pictures were lascivious."31
A clear definition of child pornography is essential to assist
in the prosecution of pornographers and thus help prevent the
exploitation and abuse of children. We need a standard that is
specific enough to ensure that pornographers can not evade the
intent of the law, as the defendant in this case attempted to do.
At the same time, the courts need a standard that is easily comprehendible to the average juror. Here, the court is giving us a
definition that meets both needs. By using eight factors for the
trier of fact to consider in the interpretation of the term lascivious, the court sets out a flexible standard that is comprehensive
enough to thwart circumvention, yet very understandable and
usable for jurors.

Linda Sullivan *

B.

JUVENILE ARREST

In Re Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d 511, 277 Cal. Rptr. 14, modiCal. Rptr. __ (4th Dist.
fied, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1623 A, _
29. See note 28 supra.
30. Aruin, 900 F.2d at 1391.
31. Id,
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; University of California,
Berkeley, B.A., Social Welfare, 1988.
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1990).
The arrest of minors, without a warrant and solely upon a basis
of probable cause, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In In re Samuel V., the court of appeal affirmed a juvenile
court's ruling that defendant, minor Samuel V., remain a ward
of the court and be detained in juvenile hall pending placement
in a 24-hour school. The appellate court's holding was based on
a finding that the Welfare and Institutions Code section which
had allowed the particular type of arrest involved in this case
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Upon a report that Samuel had brandished a knife in the
complex where he lived, peace officer Charles Pugsley told Samuel's mother to bring the minor to the police station where
Pugsley could arrest him. The peace officer did not have a warrant for the arrest. At the police station, without being advised
of his Miranda l rights, Samuel admitted being involved in the
brandishing incident. After the admission, Pugsley advised defendant of his Miranda rights. 2
While filling out a report, the peace officer asked Samuel
whether the minor carried a knife. Defendant answered in the
affirmative and, pulling a knife from his pants, gave it to Pugsley who proceeded to arrest Samuel for violation of California
Penal Code section 417(a)(1),3 which makes the brandishing of a
weapon a misdemeanor, and section 12020(a),4 which makes the
carrying of a concealed dagger a felony.1I
Samuel moved to suppress his statements and the knife al1. Miranda u. Arizona, 384 U,S. 436 (1966).
2, Samuel V., 225 Cal. App, 3d at 514.
3. Penal Code § 417(a)(1) provides in part: "Every person who, except in self-defense, in the presence of any other person, draws or exhibits any deadly weapon whatsoever, other than a firearm, in a rude, angry or threatening manner, or who in any manner, unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a misdemeanor . , . ,"
CAL. PENAL CODE § 417(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991),
4. Penal Code § 12020(a) provides in part: "Any person in this state, , . who carries concealed upon his person any dirk or dagger, is guilty of a felony . , , ," CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
5. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App, 3d at 514.
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leging they had been obtained as a result of illegal questioning.
The motion was denied. Subsequently, Samuel admitted the felony charge and the misdemeanor charge was dismissed. s Having
been declared a ward of the court a year earlier after admitting a
burglary allegation,7 defendant was ordered to remain a ward of
the court and was detained in juvenile hall pending placement in
a 24-hour school. s
On appeal, Samuel challenged the constitutionality of California Welfare and Institutions Code section 625(a)9 which allows a peace officer to arrest a minor without a warrant and
solely upon a basis of reasonable cause for believing that the minor has violated any law of this state. 10 Defendant raised an
equal protection claim based on the language of California Penal
Code section 836,11 the equivalent of the Welfare and Institutions Code stated above but as pertaining to adults. Penal Code
section 836 requires that for a warrantless arrest the peace officer have reasonable cause to believe that the adult committed a
public offense in the peace officer's presence. Samuel contended
that the differentiation involving the "in the presence" requirement was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 12 equal protection rights. 13
Initially addressing the issue of whether Samuel could raise
the constitutional claim for the first time on appeal, the appel6. [d.

7. [d. at 513 nA.
8. [d. at 513.
9. Welfare and Institutions Code § 625(a) provides in part: "A peace officer may,
without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor: [11) (a) who is under the age of
18 years when such officer has reasonable cause for believing that such minor is a person
described in Section 601 or 602 . . . . " CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625(a) (West 1984 &
Supp. 1991).
Welfare and Institutions Code § 602 provides in part: "Any person who is under the
age of 18 years when he violates any law of this state ... is within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court." CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
10. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 513.
11. Penal Code § 836 provides in part: "A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant, or may . . . without a warrant, arrest a person: [11) 1. Whenever he
has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public
offense in his presence. [11) 2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although
not in his presence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1985 & Supp 1991).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 515, 516.
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late court held the claim permissible since the issue was a pure
question of law and one based, as revealed by the record, on undisputed facts. 14
The court then upheld the constitutionality of the Welfare
and Institution Code section by analyzing the legislative history
and purpose behind the language of the statutory provision.
Originally, Penal Code section 836 (with a requirement of "in
the presence of the peace officer") had applied to both adult and
juvenile misdemeanor arrests. Welfare and Institutions Code
section 625(a) was enacted in 1961, allowing warrantless arrests
of juvenile misdemeanants without a requirement of "in the
presence of the arresting officer."11I In 1971, the legislature added
section 625.1 which implicitly imposed an "in the presence" requirement for warrantless juvenile misdemeanor arrests. 16 As a
result of section 625.1, in 1977 the California Supreme Court invalidated l7 a warrantless arrest of a juvenile for a misdemeanor
offense which was not committed in the presence of the arresting
officer. IS The following year the legislature repealed section
625.1. 19 The court of appeal held that this history showed a clear
legislative intent to leave out the "in the presence" requirement
in circumstances involving juvenile arrests. 20
The court further stated that defendant's allegation of disparate treatment had previously been raised before, and been
rejected by, the California Supreme Court in In re Eric J.21 In
that case,22 the California Supreme Court held that for purposes
of an equal protection claim, the challenger must first establish
that the classification affects in an unequal manner two or more
groups that are "'similarly situated.' "23 The Eric J. court held
that minors and adults were not similarly situated since the liberty interest of a minor is more restricted than that of an adult,
that interest being subject to a tighter regulation by the state as
14. Id. at 1623a, 1623b.
15. Id. at 515.
16. Id.

17. In re Thierry S., 19 Cal. 3d 727, 139 Cal. Rptr. 708, 566 P.2d 610 (1977).
18. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 515, 516.
19. Id. at 516.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 (1979).
23. Samuel V., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 516.
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well as being controlled by the minor's parents. 24 The supreme
court further found that the purpose behind the state's regulation of the liberty interest of juveniles differed from that involved in the case of adults. To wit, the purpose of legislation
addressing arrests of adults is principally punitive, punishment
being a strong component of adult-related criminal legislation.
In the case of juveniles, the purpose of legislation is for the most
part rehabilitative, the punishment of minors being a means to
an end, the end being treatment. 25
Applying the analysis of Eric J. to this case, the court of
appeal held that the equal protection challenge failed since the
two affected groups here, adults and juveniles, were not similarly
situated. 26 The court strengthened its holding by addressing the
nature of the "in the presence" requirement, stating that such a
requirement as applied to juveniles would hinder the state's rehabilitative goal of monitoring juvenile conduct and attacking
character flaws at the inception before they could turn into
criminal behavior.27
Sarah Afshar*

II.

FAMILY LAW

A.

LESBIAN CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS

Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520
(1990).
The former lesbian partner of the mother of a child conceived
during the relationship through artificial insemination has no
statutory right to custody or visitation when the couple's rela24. [d.
25. [d.
26. [d. at 516, 517.
27. [d. at 517.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; University of California, Los
Angeles, B.A., English literature, 1987.
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tionship terminates.
In Curiale, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff with no
natural or legal relationship to a child had no standing to assert
a claim for custody or visitation against the child's natural
mother with whom the child resides. Therefore, the trial court
did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the ground
that it did not have jurisdiction to award custody or visitation to
her. The plaintiff did not have a colorable claim of right to custody and there was no statutory basis for plaintiff's claim of parental status.
Between April 1982 and December 1987 plaintiff and defendant lived together in a homosexual relationship. Plaintiff
and defendant agreed at some point during the relationship that
defendant would conceive a child through artificial insemination
and that they would both raise the child. The child was born in
June 1985. From the time of the child's birth until June 1988,
plaintiff provided the sole financial support for herself, defendant and the child. l
The relationship between plaintiff and defendant ended in
December 1987 and plaintiff moved out of the home. The parties
executed a written settlement agreement providing for shared
physical custody of the child. 2 In June 1988, defendant informed
plaintiff that she was unwilling to continue shared custody and
visitation rights with plaintiff. 3
Plaintiff filed a "complaint to establish de facto parent status/maternity and for custody and visitation," along with an order to show cause seeking custody and visitation. Defendant
moved to quash the order to show cause and to dismiss the complaint, asserting plaintiff had no standing to initiate the
proceeding.·
In granting defendant's motion to quash and dismissing the
complaint, the trial· court reasoned that none of the Civil Code
1. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
2. Plaintiff attached a copy of this settlement agreement to the complaint, but she
did not assert any contractual claims in the trial court nor on appeal.
3. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
4. [d., 272 Cal Rptr. at 521-522.
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provisions offered by plaintiff provided a basis for the proceeding. Plaintiff based her claim on Civil Code sections 7015, 7020,
and 4600 et seq.5 Civil Code sections 7015 and 7020 are part of
the Uniform Parentage Act and deal procedurally with the determination of parentage. s However, the Court of Appeal stated
that these sections do not apply in cases where the defendant is
the undisputed natural mother as in this case. 7
The Court of Appeal held that Civil Code section 4600 does
not create jurisdiction. s Jurisdiction to adjudicate custody depends on some proceeding already properly before the court in
which custody is at issue such as dissolution, guardianship, or
dependency. Plaintiff had no standing to avail herself of any of
these. 9
The court stressed that there is no statutory or decisional
authority to grant plaintiff rights of custody and/or visitation
over the objections of the child's natural parent. 10 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that it would be in the best interest
of the child to confer legal status on someone who is acting as
the parent in a non-traditional family.ll The Legislature has not
granted a non parent in a same sex bilateral relationship any
right to custody or visitation once the relationship terminates. 12
Plaintiff argued that "with or without appropriate legislation", it
IS the court's role to "confront controversy" and "resolve dis5. See notes 6 and 8 infra.
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015 (West 1983) [Actions with respect to existence of mother
and child relationship) Any interested party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7020 (West 1983) [Restraining orders; Offenses) states in relevant part:
During the pendency of any proceeding under this part, upon application ... by the
party who has care, custody, and control of the minor child, the superior court may issue
ex parte orders enjoining any party from contacting, molesting, attacking, striking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, or disturbing the peace of the other party or
the minor child.
7. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599-1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983) states in relevant part: In any proceeding
where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the court may, during the pendency
of the proceeding or at any time thereafter, make such order for the custody of the child
during minority as may seem necessary or proper.
9. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
10. Id. (emphasis in the original) (citing Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d
386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986».
11. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
12. Id. (citing White v. Jacobs, 198 Cal. App. 3d. 122, 243 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1988».
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care of children

in
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non-traditional

The court did not view the role of the judiciary as innovator
of social policy, stating that "the Legislature is better equipped
to consider expansion of current California law should it choose
to do SO."14
This case demonstrates the difficulty the courts have applying the limited and rigid construction of our current code provisions to the myriad of family structures that exist in our society.
Citing the "complex practical, social and constitutional ramifications" of expanding the current statutes,111 the court displays a
hesitancy to take an active role in shaping policy. Unfortunately,
as the plaintiff pointed out, while we wait for the Legislature to
act, "the courts cannot avoid controversial claims and must deal
with real families with real disputes today. illS

Linda Sullivan *

B.

CONSERVATORSHIP

Kaplan v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1354, 265 Cal. Rptr.
408 (1989).
A spouse may not institute and maintain a petition to establish conservatorship of another spouse.
The Kaplan court held that a private citizen may not initi13. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
14. Id. at 1600-1601, (quoting In re Marriage of Lewis & Goetz, 203 Cal. App. 3d

514, 519-520, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (1988».
15. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 27~ Cal. Rptr. at 522.
16. Id.

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; University of California,
Berkeley, B.A., Social Welfare, 1988.
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ate conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-PetrisShort (LPS) Act. I Only the county's designated conservatorship
investigator officer may file and prosecute a petition to establish
an LPS conservatorship. 2
In summary, the LPS Act mandates that when a person, as
a result of a mental disorder, appears to be dangerous to self,
others or is gravely disabled 3 , peace officers and certain other
designated persons may, upon probable cause., take that person
to a facility designated by the county for up to 72 hours of treatment and evaluation 5 • If the professional staff of the evaluating
agency find the person as a result of mental disorder or chronic
alcoholism to be dangerous to self, others or gravely disabled 8 ,
the individual may be certified for no more than 14 days of intensive treatment'. The patient can· then file a writ of habeas
corpus 8 • After the hearing on the writ the client would be released or held up to the 14 days.9
At this point, the person in charge of the evaluating agency
may recommend to the conservatorship investigation officer that
a conservatorship be established. Io If the investigator concurs
with that recommendation, the investigator petitions the Superior Court in the county where the patient resides to establish
L CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000 - 5550 (West 1984).
2. See also D. PONE. LPS CASE SUMMARIES OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY INC. (January 29, 1990).
3. "Gravely disabled" is defined in Welfare & Institution Code § 5008 (h)(I). It
means a condition in which a person is unable to provide for his or her basic personal
needs for food, clothing or shelter.
4. To constitute probable cause to detain a person pursuant to § 5150, a state of
facts must be known to the peace officer (or other authorized person) that would lead a
person of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that
the person detained is mentally disordered and is a danger to himself or herself or is
gravely disabled. In justifying the particular intrusion, the officer must be able to point
to specific and articulate facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant his or her belief or suspicion. People v. Triplett, 144 Cal. App.
3d 283, 287·88, 192 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540-41 (1983).
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1984). See also 2 W. JOHNSTONE & S.
HOUSE. CALIFORNIA CONSERVATORSHIPS AND GUARDIANSHIPS § 15 (1990).
6. See supra note 3.
7. CAL. WELF. & INST CODE § 5150 (West 1984).
8. CAL. WELF. & INST CODE § 5275 (West 1984). Also, under Welfare & Institutions
Code § 5276, the hearing on the petition for writ must be held within 2 judicial days
after its filing.
9. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE & 5275 (West 1984).
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1984).
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conservatorship. I I
In June of 1989, two psychiatrists treating Mrs. Sonya Adler, recommended that the Public Guardian l2 commence LPS
conservatorship proceedings for Mrs. Adler. The Public Guardian, Mr. Douglas A. Kaplan, refused to act towards establishing
a conservatorship. Mr. Kaplan felt that there were alternative
measures to a conservatorship.13
Mrs. Adler's husband, Mr. Gerald Adler, petitioned the Superior Court to appoint himself and Ms. Carolyn Young co-conservators for Mrs. Adler, alleging she was gravely disabled within
the meaning of LPS.14 Mr. Adler alleged the Public Guardian
failed to conduct a proper investigation and either failed to exercise his discretion under LPS, or abused that discretion by not
commencing an LPS conservatorship proceeding. IIi Mr. Adler
also argued that if the designated agency refused to act in establishing a conservatorship, any person authorized by the Probate
Code to file a petition for conservatorship l6 may also pursue an
LPS remedy.17
The trial court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain a
petition brought by someone other than the county's designated
investigation officer. IS The Public Guardian filed an application
for extraordinary relief with the Court of Appeal seeking Mr.
Adler's petition. 19
The Court of Appeal held that only the county's designated
conservatorship investigation officer may file and prosecute a petition to establish a conservatorship under the LPS act 20 • The
court cites the legislative intent noting that the Legislature has
11. Id.
12. Each county in the state is directed to designate a conservatorship investigation
agency. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5351 (West 1984). Yolo County has designated the
office of the Public Guardian.
13. Kaplan at 1356, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
14. Id. at 1358, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
15. Id.

16. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1820 (a)(2) lists the proposed conservatee's spouse as one who
may petition for conservatorship.
17. See supra note 3.
18. Kaplan at 1357, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
19. Id.
20. Kaplan at 1360, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
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determined that the safeguards attending Probate Code conservatorships are insufficient and that the restraints of the Probate Code may be imposed only after complying with LPS21.
The court also recognized that when the power of the state is
invoked to deprive individuals of their freedom, the decision to
commence judicial proceedings should be left to a public
officer.22
A person subject to an LPS conservatorship is now further
protected under The Kaplan court's holding regarding the LPS
Act. Kaplan upholds the statutory protection of the LPS Act
which strive to eliminate indiscriminate and involuntary commitment. 23 LPS provides a neutral public investigator to investigate the need for a conservatorship or find less restrictive alternatives to a conservatorship.
Lisa K. McCally*

C.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT

In re Marriage of Watt, 214 Cal. App. 3d 340, 262 Cal. Rptr. 783
(1st Dist. 1989).
In an action for spousal support, a trial court must consider, in making its decision, the total contributions of one
spouse to the other's attainment of an education and the reasons for the marital standard of living. Reimbursement for such
contributions is limited to those expenditures directly going to
the costs of the other's education and does not include ordinary
living expenses.
21. Id.

22.Id.
23. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001 (West 1984).
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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In In re Marriage of Watt, the court of appeal held that
when making a spousal support award decision pursuant to California Civil Code Section 4801/ in a marital dissolution action,
the trial court must take into consideration the contribution for
living expenses made by one spouse to the other's attainment of
an education. The court also held that a trial court, in applying
the spousal support criterion, must consider the reasons for the
actual marital standard of living, such as a depressed standard
of living during the completion of the spouse's education. In its
decision the court further held that under Civil Code Section
4800.3 ordinary living expenses expended for the spouse's education are not reimbursable community expenditures.
In 1985, the marriage of Elaine and David Watt was terminated. 2 The Watts had been married for nine and one-half years
before separating. The couple had no children. s
During the entire nine and one-half years of marriage David
was a full time student. He advanced from an undergraduate
program to postgraduate studies and finally medical school. During the entire marriage, Elaine worked full-time using all of her
income for family expenses. Five months after their separation
David received his medical degree. 4
At the divorce trial, the court denied Elaine's request for
reimbursement for community funds spent on David's education.1i The court ordered David to pay Elaine's attorney fees but
did not grant her any further relief.6 Elaine appealed the judgment and David cross-appealed on the issue of fees.
Elaine's appeal included the issues of spousal support based
on need and funds for her career retraining. 7 The court of appeal
found no error in this part of the trial court's decision. 6
1. All further statutory references are to the California Civil Code.

2. Watt, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 345, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
3. Id. at 344, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
4.Id.
5. Id. at 346, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
6. Id. at 345, 262 Cal. Rprt. at 786.
7.Id.
8. Id. at 348·49, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 787. The trial court found that Elaine had no
need, pursuant § 4801(a)(I)(A), for retraining or education to acquire more marketable
skills. The court of appeal upheld the decision, finding substaintial evidence to support
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Elaine raised three other issues on appeal. The first involved the interpretation of amendments to the Family Law
Act,9 specifically sections 4800.3, subdivision (b)(1) and 4801,
subdivision (a)(1)(c)1° which were enacted in 1984. 11 The court
of appeal stated that although section 4800.3, subdivision (d)
limits the exclusive remedy for the education or enhanced earning capacity of a spouse to reimbursement and loan assignment,
it also elicits that nothing therein" 'shall limit consideration of
the effect of the education, training, or enhancement, or the
amount reimbursed ... the circumstances of the parties for the
purpose of an order for support pursuant to Section 4801.' "12
Looking then to section 4801, subdivision (a)(2), the court held
that the section should be interpreted broadly, stating "weighty"
consideration should be given by the trial court to all of the
working spouse's contributions to the other's attainment of an
education and enhanced earning capacity when "deciding the
propriety and extent of a spousal support award. "13 The court
went on to say that nothing in the statute's language limits
spousal contribution to direct educational expenses. 14 Finding
that the court either failed to correctly interpret the applicability of section 4801, subdivision (a)(2) or made a finding contrary
to the evidence regarding Elaine's contribution, the court of appeal reversed on this portion of the trial court's judgment.
Further regarding Elaine's appeal on the issue of support,
the court of appeal agreed with the plaintiff that the reasons for
the marital standard of living during the marriage should have
been considered when the trial court was making its spousal
the finding. [d. at 348, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
Nor did the court of appeal find error in the trial court's denial of a spousal support
award based on need. The court upheld the trial court's decision which was based on
balancing Elaine's monthly net income with her monthly expenses. [d. at 349, 262 Cal
Rptr at 788.
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4000 - 5174 (Deering 1984 & Supp. 1990).
10. The Legislature amended § 4801 subdivision (a) in 1988. Section 4801, subdivision (a)(l)(c) is now § 4801 (a)(2) and will be referred to as such hereafter. Watt, 214
Cal. App. 3d at 347 n.4, 262 Cal Rptr at 787 n.4.
11. [d. at 346, 262 Cal. Rptr at 786.
12. [d. at 350, 262 Cal. Rptr. 789.
13. [d.
14. [d. at 351, 262 Cal. Rptr. 789. In making the award the trial court shall consider
under § 4801(a)(2) "[t)he extent to which the supported spouse contributed to the at-

tainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the other spouse."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801, (Deering 1984 & Supp. 1990).
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support determination. l & The trial court held, in error, that since
Elaine's standard of living had not lowered from what it had
been during the marriage, no support was necessary. IS
The court of appeal found error in the trial court's application of section 4801 regarding the standard of living factor. The
court of appeal held that in reaching its decision the trial court
should not ignore the fact that the couple deliberately depressed
their standard of living during the marriage by having one
spouse absent from the work force while he attained his education, with the future expectation of the improvement of the
community standard of living should David obtain his medical
degree and thereafter practice medicine. 17 The trial court's
straight dollar-for-dollar analysis was rejected as the sole factor
in making such a support award. 18
Finally, in regard to Elaine's request for reimbursement for
contributions to David's education, the court of appeal disagreed
with plaintiff's interpretation of section 4800.3. The court of appeal held that section 4800.3 is limited to reimbursement for expenses related only to education-related expenses, such as tuition, fees, and books. IS As the community only paid for ordinary
15. Watt, 414 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
16. [d. at 351, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 789-790.
17. [d. at 351, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790. The Legislature, in August 1988, amended
§ 4801(A), which became effective January 1, 1989:
To make the standard of living established during the marriage an overreaching reference point against which the court
assesses the other spousal support factors. (Stat. 1988, ch. 407,
§ 1, p. 1555.) The trial court must also make specific factual
finding concerning the appropriate standard. Further, the
amendments now require the trial court to generally recognize
the extent to which the working spouse contributed to the student spouse's attainment of an education, rather than considering this factor only with respect to the earning capacity of
each spouse.
[d. at 352-353 n.8, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790 n.8.
As the parties did not present the issue of whether the 1988 amendments would apply on
remand, the court of appeal did not express an opinion concerning retroactive application. [d. at 353 n.8, 262 Cal Rptr. at 790 n.8.
18. [d. at 352, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
19. [d. at 354, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 791. The court relied on the California Law Revision
Comment to § 4800.3: .. 'Subdivision (a) does not detail the expenditures that might be
included within the concept of 'community contributions.' These expenditures would at
least included cost of tuition, fees, books and supplies, and transportation.'(CLRC Com.,
West's Ann. Code, §4800.3 (1989 pocket part supp. p. 95.)" [d.
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living expenses, no funds were reimbursable. 20
The court of appeal further rejected Elaine's argument that
unless it construed section 4800.3 as encompassing reimbursement for all living expenses "it must be declared unconstitutional." Elaine argued anything less than her interpretation is a
violation of due process and equal protection. 21 The court stated
that a right to reimbursement for a spouse's voluntary spending
for the couple's living expenses during the marriage is not constitutionally guaranteed. 22
In the alternative, Elaine asked the court of appeal to declare David's medical degree to be community property.23 The
court rejected this alternative holding, pursuant to section
4800.3, subdivision (d), the only remedy in California upon marital dissolution for educational contributions, from one spouse to
another, to be reimbursement.24
Kelly A. McMeekin*

D.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

In re Marriage of Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1236, 273 Cal. Rptr.
20. [d. at 354, 262·Cal. Rptr. at 791-792. Section 4800.3 states the basic rule that
community contributions must be reimbursed. Section 4800.3, subdivision (b)(l): "The
community shall be reimbursed for community contributions to the education or training
. of a party that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party. The amount
reimbursed shall be with interest at the legal rate, accruing from the end of the calander
year in which the contributions were made." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3, (Deering 1984).
Section 4800.3, subdivision (a) defines reimbursable community contributions. Section
4800.3, subdivision (a): " As used in this section, 'community contributions to education
or training' means payment made with community property for education or training or
for the repayment of a loan incurred for education or training." [d.
21. [d. at 345, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
22. [d.
23. [d.
24. [d. at 355, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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516 (4th Dist. 1990).

When a divorcing couple stipulates to the value of the community house, the stipulation will not be set aside on a mere showing that one of the parties had limited knowledge, which that
party treated as sufficient at the time of the stipulation.

In In re Marriage of Hahn, the court of appeal affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the stipulation to the value of the divorcing couple's residence would not be set aside upon the husband's
motion, prior to entry of judgment, to reopen the stipulated
issue.
In this action for dissolution of the parties' marriage, the
husband sought to have the family home sold and the proceeds
divided. l He stipulated to the value of the residence, a value set
by his own appraiser. 2 The trial court, however, granted the
wife's request that the property be awarded to her with appropriate set-oft's. 3 After the trial and prior to entry of judgement,
the husband sought to reopen the issue of the house's value
based on new evidence of its higher market value.· The trial
court denied the husband's motion and the husband appealed. I!
To emphasize the rationale behind the binding eft'ect of
most stipulations, the court quoted from Witkin on California
Evidence,6 holding that "'a stipulation is an agreement between ... adverse parties relating to a matter involved in a judicial proceeding' " and that a stipulation would have the force
of " 'a judicial admission removing [the stipulated] issues from
the case.'''7 Also quoting from Restatement 2nd of Contracts,S
the court held that" '[s]tipulations ... simplify and expedite
the proceeding, [as well as support] the policy of favoring compromise in order to reduce the volume of litigation.' "9 A stipulation, like a contract, is an embodiment of a compromise. lo As
1. Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1238, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
2. Id.

3. [d.
4. Id.

5.Id.
6. 1 Witkin, California Evidence § 648 (3d ed. 1986).
7. Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1239, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 94 comment a (1981).
9. Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1239, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
10. [d.
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such, reneging on one's promise not only evinces a lack of good
faith and fair dealing, but in a context such as divorce it acts as
an incentive for the other party to renege on other stipulated
values of community assets, and thus turn an otherwise short
trial into a full blown litigation. l l
The underlying assumption behind the general rule is that a
court should not have to continually redistribute community assets up to the time of final judgement on the basis of the frequently changing market value of those assets. I2 "The court is
under no obligation to undertake a continuing responsibility to
assume the role of an on-call broker or real estate
appraiser . . . ."13
The court, however, recognized that the husband's appeal
was not completely meritless since in certain instances a trial
court could properly review a stipulated value. I4 To wit, if the
property is sold or disposed of by the party entitled to it at any
time before entry of judgment, or even after appellate reversal of
the property division award, for a much higher value than that
stipulated to, the trial court should review the stipulation. 111 The
rationale behind this exception is that in case of a dramatic and
actual change in the status of the property (Le., sale, forfeiture,
etc.), a court could readily determine the fair market value of
the property and has discretion to relieve the parties from the
stipulation. I6
Here, however, there was no actual confirmation of the
value of the property through either a sale, forfeiture, or some
other method of disposition; rather, there was a post-trial request for evaluation based merely on more current information
of market valueY The court of appeal held that the exception to
the rule did not apply in this case and that it was well within the
trial court's discretion to deny the husband's motion. IS The husband's claim that he had been mistaken as to the value of the
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1241. 273 Cal Rptr. at 518. 519.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1240, 1241, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 518, 519.
15. Id. at 1240, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 518, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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house at the time of the stipulation was held not a proper defense. 19 Under contract law,20 a party bears the risk of mistake
when that party knows his knowledge to be limited and yet proceeds to form a contract.21
Since the court explained that in some situations a reevaluation would be proper, it found the husband's appeal not completely without merit and, therefore, denied the wife's request
for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. 22

Sarah Afshar*

III.

A.

TORT LAW
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Wise v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 272 Cal. Rptr.
222 (5th Dist. 1990).
The wife of a sniper is not liable for the injuries caused by
her husband either on the basis of a duty created by a special
relationship or under general negligence principles. The court
also held the wife not liable on the grounds of negligent
entrustment.
In Wise v. Superior Court, the court of appeal granted
Rosemary Wise's petition for a writ of mandate directing the
trial court to vacate its order overruling her demurrer and to
enter a new order sustaining her demurrer without leave to
amend.
19. [d. at 1241, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981).
21. Hahn, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1241, 273 Cal Rptr. at 518.
22. [d.

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; University of California, Los
Angeles, B.A., English Literature, 1987.
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On or about September 21, 1988, John Southey Wise (decedent) mounted a sniper attack from the roof of his home. Before
taking his own life, he severely injured several passing motorists,
including the plaintiffs Ginger Myers and David Luchetti. The
plaintiffs filed an action against the decedent's wife Rosemary
Wise l and her sister Michelle Gendreau,2 owner of the home in
which the Wises resided. 3
The trial court overruled the wife's demurrer to the complaint and the court of appeal granted the wife's petition for a
writ of mandate directing that the demurrer be sustained. 4 For
the purposes of the demurrer, the court of appeal assumed the
facts, alledged by the plaintiffs, to be true.1\ The allegations in
the first amended complaint were that the decedent had a "history of erractic and violent behavior prompted in part by his
abuse of drugs and alcohol," and that he was a "human time
bomb."6 Specifically the plaintiffs alleged:
'(1) a long history of arrests since 1965 including
drug possession, robbery and burglary, and a conviction for grand theft and possession of dangerous drugs; (2) a long history of alcoholism and
heavy drug use including heroin, LSD, cocaine,
barbiturates, amphetamines, and marijuana; (3) a
long history of psychiatric treatment for depression, aggressive behavior and criminal conduct;
(4) a collection of wild and dangerous animals at
defendants' residence· including a boa constrictor
and alligators and raised rabbits to feed these animals; (5) been unemployed for long periods of
time including a lengthy time prior to and on
September 21, 1988; (6) been observed romping
naked in defendants' backyard with his two small
pet alligators in 1987, and reported to police and
defendants by neighbors; (7) access to and possession of an arsenal of weapons at defendants' residence including at least eight (8) pistols, four (4)
rifles including an assault rifle, two (2) shotguns,
1. Individually and in her capacity as executor of decedent's estate.
2. Gendreau was not a party to Rosemary Wise's petition.
3. Wise, 222 Cal. App. 3d' at 1011, 272 Cal. Rpt. at 223.
4. [d. at 1016, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
5. [d. at 1011, 272 Cal. Rptr. :l.t 223.
6. [d. at 1012, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
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one (1) machine gun and ample ammunition for
all of them. . . .'7

At least one week prior to the attack, Mrs. Wise left their
home due to her husband's increasingly unstable behavior.8
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged alternative theories of liability. The complaint attempted to establish a duty by the wife
to protect the motorists based upon a special relationship or
upon general negligence principles. The complaint further alleged liability based on negligent entrustment of the weapons. 9
In regards to the special relationship portion of the claim,
the court of appeal held that the complaint failed to establish
the requisite special relationship of the defendant to either the
decedent or the plaintiffs. 1o The court recognized, that "in general one owes no duty to control the conduct of a third person to
prevent him from causing physical harm to another," but at
times a "special relationship may exist between the defendant
and either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or
the foreseeable victim of that conduct,"ll which does give rise to
such a duty. Such special relationships, t.he court stated, included those "between parent and child (citation omitted),
master and servant, (citation omitted), the possessor of land or
chattels (who has a duty to control the conduct of a licensee)
(citation omitted), and '[o]ne who takes charge of a third person
whom he knows or should know likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled'... (citation omitted)."12 The common
link between these special relationships is the ability to control
the third party. The court found no such ability in this case.
7. [d. at 1012, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
8. [d.
9. Negligent Entrustment:
'One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason
to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience or oth·
erwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable bodily
harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect
to share in, or be in the vicinity of its use, is subject to liability
for bodily harm caused thereby to them.'
Johnson v. Casetta, 197 Cal. App. 2d, 272, 273, 17 Cal. Rprtr. 81. (1961) (quoting A.L.I.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 390).
10. [d. at 1013, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
11. [d. at 1013, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 224·225.
12. [d. at 1013, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
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Finding that the natural relationship between the decedent and
his wife created no inference of an ability to control, the court
stated that the actual custodial ability must be shown. 13 The
court disagreed with the plaintiffs' assertation that the decedent
was "'dependant upon the petitioner's supervision and control,'" and that the petitioner had assumed responsibility for
her husband. 14 The court found instead that the decedent was
an individual who was beyond self-control and beyond the control of another. 111
Furthermore, the plaintiffs could not allege a special relationship between themselves and the petitioner. 16 The court
found that neither the injury nor the harm was foreseeable. 17
The only violent threat that the decedent had made was towards
a neighborhood cat, which had killed one of his rabbits. Moreover, the court stated that even if the petitioner knew of her
husband's violent potential, no facts were alleged that she knew
or could have known that her husband would engage in the type
of attack which occurred. IS
Alternatively, relying on the standards of ordinary care, the
plaintiffs contended that a special relationship need not be
plead, where the defendant, through her own actions, made the
plaintiffs' position worse and created a foreseeable risk of harm
from the third person. 19 The plaintiffs argued for the application
of the ordinary standard of care as applied in Pamela L. u.
Farmer. 20 In Pamela L., the defendant allegedly knew of her
husband's history of child molestation. Nevertheless, she encouraged and invited several young girls to use the swimming
pool at her home while she was at work and her husband was
home. 21 The court in Wise, however, distinguished Pamela L.,
finding in that case, the victims and the harm to be forseeable.
The young children were expressly invited by the defendant and
the burden to avoid the sexual assault was minimal; she could
13. [d.
14. [d. at 1014, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
15. [d.

16. [d.
17. [d.
18. [d.
19. [d.

20. [d. Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980).
21. Wise, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1014.
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have merely asked that the plaintiffs not come over when she
wasn't home. 22 In Pamela L., there was a close connection between the defendant's actions and the harm incurred, a connection which the court did not find here. 23
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim based upon
the petitioner's alleged negligent entrustment of the weapons to
her husband.24 The court found no facts to indicate that the
"petitioner actually entrusted the decedent with the weapons he
used to inflict the injuries."21i Nor, did the court find that the
possible co-ownership of the weapons gave rise to constructive
negligent entrustment, as no facts indicated that the defendant
aided or facilitated her husband's use of the weapons. 26
In conclusion, the plaintiffs offered several public policy
reasons why the court should follow the "trend to 'expand the
list of special relationships which justify imposing liability,' "27
and impose liability upon the petitioner in this case; to wit "the
benefit to the community of reducing 'the risk that citizens will
encourage mentally ill family members to repeat this all 'too familiar type of mass shooting-suicide incident;' "28 the fact that
the damages would be used to pay for the extensive medical
bills; and the fact that there was home insurance available. 29
The court felt, however, that there were public policy reasons for
limiting the scope of liability of the petitioner here. 30 Particularly, the court stated its belief that "the responsibility for tortious acts should lie with the individual who commits those acts;
absent facts which clearly give rise to a legal duty that responsibility should not be shifted to a third party."31
While attitudes towards the roles of women in society have
changed over the years, the plaintiffs, in this case, expose the
22. Id. at 1014, 1015, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 225, 226.
23. Id. at 1015, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
24. This claim was based upon the allegation that the petitioner had a community
property interest in the weapons. Id.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27. Id., (quoting Pamela L., supra, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 211).
28. Id. at 1015. The court took offense to this suggestion, that the petitioner "encouraged" the decedent's attack. Id. at 1015 nA, 272 Cal. Rptr. 226 nA.
.
29. Id. at 1015, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
30.Id.
31. Id. at 1016, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
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continuing attitude still held by some in society, that women are
or should be responsible for the irresponsible acts of men. This
attitude is prevelant in many rape cases, where the victim is
often blamed for the acts of her attacker.

In this case, the plaintiffs seem to liken the wife's role to
that in a parent-child relationship. They put the husband in the
position of acting as child to his own wife, rather than as an
individual, equal participant in a marriage. Fortunately, the
court realized that merely because one is married, tortious
liabilty for the actions of your spouse is not automatically imposed.
Kelly A. McMeekin*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991

29

